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Prof. Dr. Reiner Keller
The following publication brings together two lectures delivered
by Haideh Moghissi as “Jakob-Fugger-Zentrum International Vi-
siting Professor” from June 26 to July 3, 2017 at the University of
Augsburg.
Haideh Moghissi is emerita Professor of Sociology and Equity
Studies at York University, Canada. She was a founder of the Ira-
nian National Union of Women and a member of its first execu-
tive and editorial boards before leaving Iran in 1984. At York Uni-
versity in Toronto, Haideh Moghissi has served as Associate Dean
of External and International Relations for the Faculty of Liberal
Arts and Professional Studies; as coordinator of the Certificate
for Anti-Racist Research and Practice, as Chair of the Executive
Committee of the Centre for Feminist Research and as a member
of the executive committee of the Centre for Refugee Studies and
the Graduate Program in Women and Gender Studies.
She has regularly commented on Iran and women’s affairs in the
Middle East on various media, for example on CBC, TVO, the
BBC World Service, Radio France and Voice of America, and has
sat on the editorial and advisory boards of the Journal of Compa-
rative Public Policy, the Women and Politics series by Routledge,
Resources for Feminist Research and Feminist Forum. Her first
book focused on Populism and Feminism in Iran: Women’s Strug-
gle in a Male- Defined Revolutionary Movement (Moghissi 1994)
and her second book, Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism:
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Haideh Moghissi’s lectures at the University of Augsburg focused
on the challenges posed to modern societies by migration, inte-
gration, Islamism and Islamophobia. On June 26, she delivered
her opening lecture, “Islamism, Islamophobia, Feminism: Chal-
lenges of the Twenty-First Century,” in which she addressed the
various problems and difficulties facing societies in Islamic con-
texts as well as on the global level. Moghissi focused in particular
on gender equality and the struggles to achieve equality between
the sexes in a global context. Her second public university lecture
delivered on June 29 addressed one of the most pressing problems
of our time, namely “Migration, integration and belonging in the
Age of Globalization.”
One of the main goals of the Visiting Professorship is to integrate
the speaker with students, the University and the city’s society.
Therefore, Prof. Moghissi not only held public lectures, but also
conducted a seminar for master’s and PhD students in which she
discussed “Research as a Democratic Process” in connection with
several students’ research projects.
Her stay in Augsburg was crowned by a public panel discussion
on “Gender Equality and the Challenges of a Globalized World,”
which took place on July 3 in the Rococo Room of the Govern-
ment Buildings of the Government of Swabia, with Prof. em. Dr.
Leonie Herwartz-Emden (University of Augsburg) and Prof. Dr.
Angelika Poferl (Technical University of Dortmund) as further
panelists. Prof. Dr. Reiner Keller, speaker of the Board of Directors
of the Jakob-Fugger-Zentrum, moderated the discussion and the
following exchange with the wider audience.
The organization for the Visiting Professorship lies with the Ja-
kob-Fugger-Zentrum, the Center for Advanced Transnational Stu-
dies in the Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of
The Limits of Postmodern Analysis (Moghissi 2000), won the
Choice Outstanding Academic Books Award for Sociology and
has been translated into multiple languages. With her exceptional
book Diaspora by Design: Muslims in Canada and Beyond (Mog-
hissi/Rahnema/Goodman 2009), she once again provided insights
into her rich knowledge about Muslim migration and the mis-
conceptions about it. In addition, a multitude of journal articles,
conference papers and lectures document her outstanding life’s
work.
Haideh Moghissi’s extensive body of research focusses on gender
and Islam, Muslim diaspora and race relations. All of her work
has been consistently and profoundly informed by her resolute
commitment to meaningful, sustainable change, to social justice,
democracy and the core values of equity, dignity, human rights
and responsible citizenship. In recognition of her influential body
of work, Haideh Moghissi was awarded a Trudeau Foundation
Fellowship in 2011. She also won the Status of Women Award of
Distinction from the Ontario Confederation of Faculty Associa-
tions (OCUFA) in 2015.
Hence we were greatly honored by Prof. em. Dr. Haideh Moghis-
si’s acceptance of the invitation to fill the “Jakob-Fugger-Zentrum
International Visiting Professorship” at the University of Augs-
burg during the summer semester 2017. The Professorship is a
cooperation project between the three Humanities and Social
Sciences Faculties at the University of Augsburg, including the
departments of Catholic Theology, Philology and History, and
Philosophy and the Social Sciences. In the present case, it was the
Faculty of Philosophy and Social Sciences which had the honor of
extending the invitation to Haideh Moghissi and welcomed her
with excitement.
1110
Islamism, Islamophobia, Feminism: 
Challenges of the Twenty-First Century
Haideh Moghissi
The world seems haunted by the threat of Islamist terrorism.
Western leaders repeatedly tell us that this is a new dangerous
trend. The truth, however, is that it is not. People of my genera-
tion remember the frequent terrifying terrorist attacks in Europe,
in Canada and the United States, the deadliest of which occurred
during the 1970s and 1980s (the era of Germany’s Baader-Meinhof
Gang, Italy’s Red Brigades, Spain’s E.T.A., the UK’s Irish Republi-
can Army and Canada’s Quebec Liberation Army) that by some
estimates involved at least ten terror attacks, kidnappings or
bombings per week. Even greater numbers of these assaults oc-
curred in the United States during the same period, committed
by such groups as the Puerto Rican separatist groups (with 40 at-
tacks in New York City) and the Jewish Defense League (27 at-
tacks). Closer to our time, the US experienced terrorism, com-
mitted mostly by white supremacists, such as the Oklahoma city
bombing that killed 168 people, and the Unibomber, who terrori-
zed the US for almost 20 years until mid-1990s. The world was
shocked also by terrorist violence in Norway, where a massive
bombing targeted the government headquarters in Oslo and a lar-
ge number of defenseless teenagers were massacred at the Labor
Party’s annual summer youth camp in 2011. An Internet search
on the subject will yield numerous acts of terror committed by
left- and right-wing terrorist groups.
Augsburg, in collaboration with the above mentioned faculties.
The mission of the Center is to strengthen and intensify transna-
tional research in the humanities, cultural studies and social sci-
ences at the University of Augsburg. It contributes to establishing
connections between researchers across disciplines and national
borders, and it facilitates the communication of research findings
to audiences both inside and outside the academic world. The
Professorship invites a wide range of individuals with outstanding
achievements in science, academia, politics, society, the arts and
literature. With public lectures, seminars and debates on topical
and relevant social and political issues, the Professorship creates
an important exchange platform between the guests, the univer-
sity and the residents of Augsburg. Past invitees include Ambas-
sador Avi Primor in summer 2016 and the Islamic theologian and
sociologist Mouhanad Khorchide in winter semester 2016/17. On
behalf of both the Faculty of Philosophy and Social Sciences and
the Jakob-Fugger-Zentrum, I would like to thank everyone who
helped make this lecture series possible.
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mic traditions are observed and what type of Islam is practiced –
that is, whether it is Islam as a formal legal system under clerical
rule with strict adherence to the Shari’a (Islamic laws) treated as
fixed, unchanging and unchangeable; or Islam as a set of abstract
moral guidelines stipulated in the Quran, to turn to whenever
and in whatever way the believer wants; or Islam as an expression
of cultural and ethnic identity, as is the case for a large majority
of Muslims both inside or outside majority Muslim countries; or
Islam as a political ideology for establishing a utopian Islamic so-
ciety. That is, Islam, like other religions, has the capacity to adapt
to different cultures and to the exigencies of the time, depending
on corresponding socio-economic conditions and on the domi-
nant political mood in a particular historical period.
For example, in 1948, when the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights was drafted in the UN, Saudi Arabia was the only Muslim
country that abstained from voting, on the grounds that the pro-
visions for religious liberty violated Islamic laws. But Pakistani
representative voted for it, arguing that Islam endorsed freedom
of conscience. Moreover, Iran’s representatives at the UN, Dr.
Ghasem Qani and Fraidoon Hoveida, participated in the process
of drafting the UDHR document. Both Pakistan and Iran were
Muslim countries then, as they are today. But obviously at the ti-
me they adhered to a different interpretation of Islam than they
do today.
How can this difference in the attitude of Muslims and the rise of
militant Islam be understood? The rise and growth of the influ-
ence of the Islamists have multiple causes. The rise to power of
the Islamists in Iran certainly had a major influence on the re-
emergence and advances of Islamism in other countries in the re-
gion. Ironically, the re-emergence of militant Islamism in turn
prompted the rise of right-wing populism in Europe and the Uni-
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What distinguishes Islamist terrorism from these earlier forms of
terrorism, according to Robin Wright writing in the New Yorker
(June 5, 2017), is its missions, messages and means of mobilizati-
on and the fact that present-day terrorism is indiscriminate (it do-
esn’t remain within boundaries directly related to the terrorists’
cause). I would suggest, however, that there are more essential
differences between past and present-day terrorist violence which
are relevant for our discussion here: First, there is the fact that
present-day terrorists have de facto links with a transnational
central command, which is itself supported by some nation-
states. Second, the present-day terrorists by and large have under-
gone “self-radicalization” with limited help from that central
command; to be sure, they get their clues or instructions via the
Internet but they choose the timing, the place and the means of
committing their crimes themselves. Third, the perpetrators not
only kill but are prepared to be killed, because they supposedly
will be rewarded in the afterlife. And, finally, the present-day ter-
rorists are Muslims and their crimes tap into a historical reservoir
of anti-Islamic prejudice, anti-Arab hostility and Islamophobia
that, following 9/11, flow freely throughout the West. The openly
expressed animosity of Islamists to the West, the rigid and sexist
version of the faith that they preach and their unbelievable cru-
elty when it comes to achieving their political goals all generate
more confusion about Islam and Muslims and make it harder for
the public to differentiate between Islamic fundamentalists, or
Islamism and Muslims.
The fact is that Islam is not an essentialist and monolithic entity.
Nor is there a unifying Islamic identity that all Muslims embrace.
Islam is the product of various interpretations of Scripture, adop-
ted over many centuries in different societies in the context of in-
digenous cultures and local customs, in close connection with
the political context which determined the extent to which Isla-
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ted States, and a vicious cycle was created by their mutual influ-
ence, in a process in which the strengthening of one leads to the
strengthening of the other, with detrimental results for the world.
Aside from ecological devastations caused by the same process,
this vicious cycle undoubtedly poses the greatest threat to civili-
zation, modernity and all the major human achievements of the
past centuries. In a sense, we are currently experiencing the clas-
hes between two forms of extremism, extremism of the market
under neoliberalist imperialism and the Islamic extremism. My
focus here is on the latter.
We need to cast our gaze back about a century to understand the
political circumstances that gave rise to the situation in which
we find ourselves today. Understanding this historical back-
ground is necessary because political circumstances do not
change overnight, but gradually, sometimes without people fully
understanding where they are heading. Although there were ear-
lier instances of Islamic fundamentalism (Ibn Hanbal, 780-855;
Ibn Taiemiya, 1263-1328; and Muhamad Abd al Wahhab, 1703-
1792), Islamism or militant Islam is a new phenomenon. In the
late 1920s in Egypt, Hassan al-Banna established the Muslim
Brotherhood with the aim of fighting “cultural imperialism” and
establishing a pure Islamic order. But his movement, despite at-
tracting many followers, was not able to achieve very much. After
Hassan al-Banna’s assassination, his followers, notably Sayyid
Qutb, could not turn the movement into a widespread populist
uprising and most of the leadership was hanged by the Young Of-
ficers of the new republic. The Muslim Brotherhood’s obscuran-
tist ideas,
1)
including their forthright misogyny, however, conti-
nued to inspire many Sunni fundamentalists who came to promi-
nence at a later time, including Osama Bin Laden. Some of these
ideas were revived during the so-called Arab Spring in 2011, when
the Brotherhood achieved majorities in elections and won the
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presidency for a short time in Egypt. But despite their retreat, it
is a dormant giant waiting for the opportune moment to rise
again. However, that is a different story.
In the post-war period, the US and Britain selected the Islamists
as allies in their Cold War policy to contain the influence of the
former Soviet Union and, by extension, the nationalist and socia-
list forces that were considered a serious threat to the West’s geo-
political and economic interests in the Middle East. The support
they gave to the Muslim Brotherhood against the nationalist go-
vernments of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, and to Fedayeen Is-
lam in Iran against Mohamad Mossadeq, is well documented.
The links between imperialism – and subsequently neoliberalism
– and Islamism may be understood more clearly by looking at the
example of Iran and the processes through which an oil-rich and
fast-developing country fell to the Islamists following the 1979
revolution. In the early 1950s, the democratically elected secular
government of Mohamad Mossadeq came to power, demanding
an equal share of the profits from the Iranian oil industry, which
at the time was fully controlled by the British. The British rejected
this demand, which was supported by a mass nationalist move-
ment, and decided to bring down Mossadeq’s government instead.
Unable to do so alone, they sought the help of the Americans who
eagerly agreed subject to getting a sizable share of the Iranian oil.
The agreement was reached and CIA orchestrated a coup in 1953.
This was the first, but obviously not the last, successful regime
change in the Middle East orchestrated by the UK/US. After the
coup, the West’s oil companies democratically divided up Iranian
oil among themselves (BP got 40%, US companies 40%, Royal
Dutch-Shell 14%, and the remaining 6% went to the France’s
CFP, now Total). Dictatorial rule was re-established with the help
of American and Israeli advisors, along with the brutal suppressi-
gime, only to be toppled by an even more radical Islamist group,
the Taliban, in 1996.
No one, perhaps not even the US and the British governments
that used the Afghan Mujahideen and the Taliban, and later Al
Qaeda, against the then Soviet forces, thought that they were
nurturing the monsters that would eventually turn on them. This
has been the story in the whole region running parallel to the mil-
lions of dollars spent by the Saudis to create or boost Islamist in-
stitutions and fill the gaps in social assistance, educational and
medical services in Palestine, Egypt, Jordan and elsewhere, in or-
der to enhance Islamist influence and popularity. And this is how
Saudi Arabia, which had little influence outside the Arabian Pen-
insula before the discovery of oil in 1936, assumed a major role
on the Middle Eastern and the global political stage. After the oil
bonanza of the early 1970s, the Saudis started to use their massive
surplus funds to build mosques and propagate Salafist ideology
abroad. Being staunch anti-socialists, they aligned themselves
more and more closely with the Americans in their global anti-
left and anti-Soviet campaigns of the Cold War era, which culmi-
nated in the long Afghan war, and which continues today. The la-
test demonstration of this unholy alliance was Donald Trump’s
attempt to create a so-called Arab NATO during his trip to the re-
gion in May 2017.
Subsequent events leading to the rise of other Islamist radical
groups include the first invasion of Iraq against the former US
ally, Saddam Hussein, in 1991; Afghanistan turning into the re-
cruitment and the training ground for Islamists from other coun-
tries, including Bin Landen’s Al Qaeda; the September 11 attack,
which was orchestrated from Afghanistan; the second invasion
and total devastation of Iraq in 2003; and the emergence of ISIL
and its expansion following the destruction of Syria. In Syria, a
on of all secular nationalist and left-wing forces. Combating the
political and ideological influence of the Soviets called for the
forceful suppression of the Iranian nationalist, liberal and socialist
forces. The mosques and Islamist institutions remained the only
possible gathering places and, with some exceptions, the Islamists
were allowed to continue their activities.
A decade later, when Khomeini, then a mid-ranking Ayatollah ob-
jected to the Shah’s reforms which had been demanded by Ameri-
cans, he was sent into exile. During the political upheavals of 1978-
79, in the absence of genuine secular nationalist and left-wing lea-
ders, many of whom had been silenced or physically eliminated by
the Shah’s regime, Khomeini and his followers could effectively
use the mosques and Islamic associations networks for mobilizing
the masses of people with populist religious narratives and false
promises, ending the monarchy, pushing the left and nationalists
out of the picture and establishing an Islamic state in Iran.
When Afghan communists orchestrated an ill-judged coup against
the Davoud government in Afghanistan in 1978, leading to the
disastrous Soviet invasion a year later, the US turned these events
into a major opportunity for defeating the Soviets by mobilizing
seven Islamist groups of Mujahideen,
2)
who were angered by the
occupation and what they condemned as radical reforms and
changes, including the declaration of gender equality. As the war
dragged on and with the loss of Iran in the 1979 revolution, the
US government turned to Pakistan, which at the time was under
the rule of an Islamist general, Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, with the
support of the Jamaat-e-Islami, another brand of Islamist funda-
mentalism, for training, financing and equipping militant groups,
including Taliban, who were orphans of the long and brutal war,
brought up in the religious schools funded and operated by Saudis.
The Mujahedeen eventually established a brutal and corrupt re-
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ciety from “cultural contamination.” And terrorism “experts”
call on the public to be on the lookout for suspicious behavior by
Muslim (or people who look like Muslims). It is puzzling to them
that some boys and girls, born and raised in Europe or North
America, leave the comfort of their homes to join the rank of mi-
litant Islamists – or worst, why some of them resort to despicable
acts of terror against innocent fellow-citizens.
The theories in circulation about this phenomenon are many.
The familiar explanation is the predisposition of Islam to back-
wardness and violence, as if Muslim-ness is a quasi-biological
trait that is inherited and automatically reproduced (Modood,
2005). All people who originate from Muslim majority countries
are identified as Muslim, plain and simple, regardless of whether
or not they are Muslim, or believers for that matter. The identifier
“Muslim,” however, implies much more than a religious or na-
tional affiliation. It entails a veiled suspicion or charge of poten-
tiality/capacity for terrorism. In other words, Muslims are tacitly
assumed to be collectively responsible for the acts of terror.
George W. Bush and Donald Trump’s executive orders banning
the entire populations of a select number of majority Muslim
countries from travelling to the United States are a reflection of
this assumption. An interesting study of the media portrayal of
crimes in the US shows that the terms used to describe or identify
those committing a crime in that country vary. That is, white cri-
minals are described as being “mentally disturbed,” “loners” or
“lone wolves,” while the terms “thugs” and “terrorists” are re-
served for Blacks and Muslims, respectively.
The second explanation is the failure of integration policies in
the receiving societies where Muslims live. The argument is that
fixation with “culture” and cultural differences and overt or co-
vert racism that leads to discrimination set Muslims apart from
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genuine secular uprising against the Assad regime soon turned
into a proxy war between the US and Russia, and their respective
regional allies, Saudi Arabia and Iran, leading to the total de-
struction of cities and hundreds of thousands of people killed and
millions displaced.
The invasion and disintegration of Libya, on the one hand, aggra-
vated tribal conflicts and soon led to the rise of new Islamist
groups, not only in Libya but also in neighboring Chad, Mali and
other parts of northwest Africa. Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM), which had originated in Algeria, expanded its activities
and, along with other Islamists and tribal rebels, wreaked havoc
in this part of Africa, which was already suffering under economic
crises, man-made drought and mismanagement, corruption occa-
sioned by the imposed neoliberal policies, poverty and unem-
ployment. The opportunity to escape from misery and hopeless-
ness was offered to the youth along with their East African
neighbors in the Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia – themselves deva-
stated in the Cold War conflicts
3)
– as well as in North-west Africa
by the opening of Libya borders with the Mediterranean and
Europe. The rise of several Islamist groups in Syria, outdoing each
other in ruining the Syrian cities and killing people, in addition
to the atrocities of the Assad regime, lead to a dramatic increase
in the number of asylum seekers. According to UNHCR estima-
tes, in the first six months of 2016 alone 135,711 people had rea-
ched Europe by sea.
In all Western countries law-makers and policy makers are now
mobilized to control the mass migration from the Middle East
and Africa. Muslims are alleged to be conquering the West step
by step, destroying it from within. Hence security-driven immi-
gration and settlement policies focus from country to country on
how to observe, contain and control Muslims and to protect so-
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recycles the ancient Christian animosity against Islam, while it
is motivated by specific political goals. Consider, for example,
that so far all terrorists have come either from Saudi Arabia, Pa-
kistan, Afghanistan or North African countries. Not a single one
from Iran. I oppose everything that the Iranian regime stands for,
but when Iran is identified by Donald Trump, Benjamin Netanya-
hu and the king of Saudi Arabia as the main promoter of terrorism
in the region and an existential threat to Israel or to its neighbo-
ring Arab countries, as well as a threat to the world security, then
I can’t help thinking that some consideration other than concern
over terrorism is at work here.
In any case, making Muslims guilty by association simply obscu-
res the remarkable diversity among the over one-and-a-half billi-
on Muslims worldwide. The reality is that the fusion of religion
with indigenous cultures has produced a rainbow of Muslims of
differing national origin, language, rural-urban roots, class and
sectarian affiliations. Muslims include orthodox believers, practi-
cing individuals, non-practicing skeptics, secular and laicist
members, as well as non-believers. Among practicing Muslims
you will find a small minority of radical Islamists and a vast ma-
jority of peaceful and moderate adherents with different behavio-
ral patterns and lifestyles. Given the internal divisions and the
clashes between absolutist and moderate Muslims, and clashes
even within each group, the world’s over one-and-a-half billion
Muslims are more divided than they are united. The horrifyingly
large numbers of Muslims who fall victim to the blind, brutal ter-
ror at the hands of other Muslims in Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan
and Syria, in the name of defending Islamic prescriptions and va-
lues, testifies to this reality. For exactly this reason, some scholars
speak of clashes within the singular “Muslim civilization” as op-
posed to Huntington’s clashes between civilizations. Others sug-
gest that the term “Islams,” rather than the singular term “Is-
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the rest of the society and affect their everyday lives and socioe-
conomic status, in terms of housing, schooling and access to he-
alth care and other social services. This causes disillusionment
and disaffection with the second country among self-identified
Muslims. Although alienation from receiving societies is an un-
deniable reality, it is not sufficient to explain the influence of Is-
lamism among certain section of the population, in particular
youths.
The third theory blames the rampant Islamophobia in Western
countries for forcing Muslims to take refuge in pre-existing cultu-
re, and sometimes even in religion, for a sense of community, the-
reby becoming receptive to Islamist political stands. If we accept
the definition of Islamophobia as “unfounded hostility towards
Muslims, and therefore fear or dislike of all or most Muslims,”
(Runnymede 1997) then Islamophobia in Europe and North Ame-
rica is a pest in all democratic societies. In a good collection of re-
ports on Islamophobia in Europe published by Berkeley University,
California (available on the Internet) we read that Islamophobic
attacks in France have increased by 130 percent since 2015. The
section on Germany reports that Anti-Muslim sentiments are
supported by roughly half of the population and 20 percent are
also prepared to translate these views into political action. 17 as-
saults per week were also registered by the authorities and an ave-
rage of 37 attacks per week was reported in local media. In the US,
the FBI statistics confirm that anti-Islamic hate crimes spiked by
1600 percent after 9/11. In Canada, which so far has not experi-
enced terrorist attacks similar to those in Europe and the US, we
get frequent reports of verbal or physical abuse against individual
Muslims. A most horrible form of Islamophobia was the attack on
Muslim prayers in a Quebec City Mosque recently where a young
man entered a mosque killing six men and wounded 17 more.
What are the merits of each of these theories? The first position
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tes the second-largest religion in Canada (1,053,700), following
Christianity, according to the 2011 Canadian National Household
Survey. Nonetheless, my own research showed that Canadian
Muslims are in an economically disadvantageous position, with
an unemployment rate twice the Canadian average and a median
income 37 percent lower than the Canadian average, in spite of
having a post-secondary education level twice that of the Cana-
dian average. The difficulty of integrating into the labor market
and isolation from the larger society leads to what has been called
“long-distance nationalism.” There is much truth in this theory,
but it does not fully add up either. For in the same study we found
that despite the relatively inhospitable conditions for Muslims in
the post-9/11 period, the overwhelming majority take a very po-
sitive view of their choice of a new home country. That is, despite
dissatisfaction with the low levels of occupational and economic
achievement, 70 percent of male and female participants in the
study thought that their decision to migrate to Canada was the
right one. And by and large they expressed support for Canada’s
liberal democracy and its multicultural tolerance from which
they benefit. Therefore, we need to look to other political and
psychological factors that may assist us in gaining a better under-
standing of the appeal of the above-mentioned long-distance na-
tionalism of Muslims.
As for the third position – that is, the disaffecting impact of Isla-
mophobia on Europe’s Muslim population – this form of the hate
crime must indeed be condemned and punished in the interests
of the security and the dignity of Muslims and the larger society.
However, in a very perverse way, Islamophobes and Islamists
match and mutually need each other. Not only do they cloud the
humanity and the rich history of Islamic rationalist philosophical
and spiritual exploration and their innovation and significant
contributions to the world civilization, but they also share anti-
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lam,” better captures the diversity of Islamic beliefs, practices
and values.
But the problem is that the existence of a larger number of laicist
persons of Muslim heritage is recognized neither by devout Mus-
lims nor by average citizens or mainstream media or the govern-
ments in the West. Unlike non-religious Jews and non-religious
Christians, the category of “cultural” or secular/laicist Muslims
is almost totally ignored. The irony here is that nobody would
ever consider the actions, pronouncements or directives of Ame-
rican fundamentalist TV evangelists, or even the Pope, as remotely
representative of the views, beliefs and lifestyles of all Christians.
The second position has some merits as the ever-deepening psy-
chological, emotional and, increasingly, reasoning gulf between
the Western and majority Muslim nations, and by extension bet-
ween the citizens of European ancestry and Diasporas of Muslim
origin in the West, has been one of the most tragic, and perhaps
lasting, calamities caused by 9/11. For the live-and-let-live atti-
tude that by and large prevailed in relations among citizens in
these societies for decades has now been replaced by a mutual
sense of resentment and distrust, fear, anxiety and psychological
insecurity. Assuming that the overwhelming challenge for the
majority of migrants, particularly when the “race” factor is in
play, is inclusion in the job market and creating a niche in the
new country that provides them with economic rewards and per-
sonal satisfaction, Muslim populations do not seem to have suc-
ceeded in creating such a niche in any country in the West.
Take the example of the Muslim population in Canada, where go-
vernment policies toward the Muslim population, which grew by
128% in a single decade,
4)
are more liberal and accommodating
than many other countries. (Moghissi et al. 2009) Islam constitu-
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These aggressions communicate the infuriating message that the
West stands above the system of international law and that Ame-
rican, and indeed, Western values are of a higher moral order, and
hence their imposition on others is justified. Some similar strate-
gies adopted at the domestic level are no less injurious to the sen-
se of identity and self-worth of people of Islamic heritage. In 2015,
the then conservative government of Canada passed legislation
to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Civil
Marriage Act and the Criminal Code. The goal of the new legis-
lation was to specify that practicing polygamy makes a perma-
nent resident or foreign national inadmissible in Canada. The le-
gislation also set the marriage age at 16 and defined marriage as
the union made only between two consenting adults. (Statutes of
Canada 2015) This may be read as a praiseworthy measure against
child marriage and forced marriages, to protect the venerable wo-
men and girl children, specifically, but not solely of Muslim he-
ritage (although there are some small Mormon communities who
observe the same practices). But the government chose to call the
legislation the Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act.
Frankly, it is hard not to feel that the selection of this title was a
deliberate provocation intended to offend and insult Muslims.
To take another example: In 2011, then French President Nicolas
Sarkozy sent a bill to the parliament aimed at the inclusion in
school curricula of a discussion of the positive aspects of French
colonialism in the Maghreb. It is not hard to imagine the extent
of the rage this caused among people of North African descent in
France. More recently, Donald Trump during a media interview
described how, while enjoying a “beautiful chocolate cake” after
dinner in his Florida mansion with his Chinese counterpart, he
informed the Chinese president of the US bombing of Syria,
which followed testing by the US of the “mother of all bombs” in
Afghanistan. Any reasonable person would wonder how this he-
democratic and hostile attitudes toward all forms of difference –
ideological, social and sexual – and the gendered character of their
messages. For all of these reasons, radical Islamism poses no less
a threat than does Islamophobia to the wellbeing of citizens in all
democratic societies, because of its absolutist and uncompromi-
singly crude worldviews and actions, its twisted understanding
of the notions of justice and dignity, its stance against freedom of
religion and freedom from religion, and its determination to an-
nihilate all those considered to be anti-Islam or apostate, Muslims
and non-Muslims alike, as well as, and particularly its embedded
misogyny.
In recounting these three positions, I am suggesting that without
denying the existence of racism, Islamophobia and discriminati-
on against self-identified Muslims on the job market, something
larger than personal hurt is at stake here. And that is the selective
application of international rules of conduct or human rights
standards, which has a greater impact on the psyche of individual
Muslims, inside and outside majority Muslim countries, than
the social and economic factors. In some extreme cases, this
factor stimulates active or tacit support for Islamists, or at least
a reluctance to come out forcefully against all of what these
groups stand for. Examples of the global political events that
alienate and disenchant ordinary Muslims are too many to enu-
merate. Israel’s war in Lebanon and in the occupied Palestine,
the siege of Gaza which deprives Gazans from such basic things
as fresh water, electricity and medicine, not to mention the in-
vasion and destruction of several major majority Muslim coun-
tries in the region, come to mind. Many people from the region
see these events as proof that the politics of oil and geopolitical
colonial interests define when and where Western powers strike
with impunity and without any consideration for the lives of in-
nocent people.
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Copts and Pakistani Christians, are inexcusable crimes that must
be unconditionally condemned and punished. It is only to suggest
that the world has to try to untangle the knots of this very com-
plex situation if the climate of fear and more fear, both in the re-
gion and in Anglo-European countries, and the moral dilemma it
creates for justice and peace, are to end.
Several points are crucial in this regard. First, is that it is not
enough to capture and punish the terrorists without scrutinizing
the Western powers’ foreign and military policies and adventures,
which have created a chain of conflict zones with the disastrous
outcomes of uprooting and displacing millions of people from
their traditional homelands, only a tiny fraction of whom end up
in Europe and North America. The focus on security and the so-
called war on terror, which has dramatically diminished the glo-
bal efforts for reducing poverty in the less developed countries, it-
self a strategy for producing refugees, must be reconsidered. Note,
for example, that the EU has pledged $1.5 billion in development
aid to Afghanistan annually, 42 percent of which goes to defense
and security. Canada has pledged $467m, $195m of which goes to
the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) – not
to mention the reduction or halt to assistance to the United Na-
tions Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East (UNRWA) and channeling the funds to training Palestinian
security forces instead, as the former right-wing Canadian go-
vernment did for years.
But let me draw attention in particular to how all this affects wo-
men and how their bodies, life chances and personal liberties are
negatively impacted by Islamism and neo-imperialism, and the
“global Jihad” between the two – one in the name of religious and
moral purity of the Muslim societies against Western imperia-
lism, the other in the name of secular humanism and democracy.
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artless arrogance, which sees Muslims not as individual human
beings but as pointers of backwardness (the deep-seated Islamo-
phobia that produced Abu Ghraib), could fail to cause rage and in-
dignation, particularly among Muslims who are at the receiving
end of these atrocities.
Let me hasten to add that not learning from the mistakes of the
past has been the hallmark of US and British policies in the region.
Since 9/11, for example, all sensible people knew how toxic for
the well-being of people in the region and for the global peace are
the aggressions committed by Western powers in the name of wa-
ging war on terror. No one should have really been surprised by
the enormous boost that militant Islamism received following
the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, the complete devastation of
Iraq and the destruction of Libya and Syria. What is worse, we
now know that the father and brothers of the Libyan terrorist
who murdered 22 people and wounded many more in Manchester
in May were known to British security forces because they had
formed a Manchester Islamic Fighters group travelling frequently
between the UK and Libya during the 2012 eruption of the anti-
Gaddafi revolts. The British government which referred to this
and similar groups at the time as “rebels,” not terrorists, had no
problem with the activities of these people and their back and
forth traffic with the aim of causing violence and destruction in
Libya.
Stating these realities is not to justify or excuse the horrendous
crimes committed by the brain-washed youth who are being in-
creasingly desensitized against violence and are trained to com-
mit unimaginably heinous atrocities. The monstrous terrorist
acts in Manchester and London, attacks on the Christmas market
in Berlin, other terrorist attacks in Nice, Paris, Stockholm and Ja-
karta, as well as the repeated, senseless shootings of Egyptian
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Erdogan’s AKP social engineering scheme aimed at reversing over
80 years of legal and social reforms in favor of women and his pu-
blic pronouncements that equality between men and women “is
against nature,” continually stressing motherhood as women’s
main role and vilifying working women, have certainly influen-
ced policy directions at odds with gender equity and have embol-
dened misogynistic attitudes. This is reflected among other
things in a dramatic increase in violence against women. The
Turkish Ministry of Justice has revealed that, between 2003 and
2010, there has been an astonishing increase of 140 percent in the
number of women murdered in the country. (Tremblay 2014)
The situation is even worse in Iran. A study undertaken by the
Iran Red Crescent Medical Journal estimated that, between 2003
and 2006, 66 percent of married women in Iran were subjected to
physical violence. (Hajnasiri et al. 2016) The violent harassment
of women, as well as sexual pestering in streets (Mozahemat-e
Khiabani) and other public places, according to a representative
of the judiciary, have increased 98 percent in just the last two ye-
ars. This figure does not include a spate of acid attacks against
women in 2014-15 in several Iranian cities. It is important to note
that these criminal activities were committed at the same time
that the parliament was debating a bill that provides legal pro-
tection for individuals who volunteer to prevent “social vice” as
ordered by the Ayatollah.
I am aware that this complex and multi-layered political situation
inflicts a great deal of personal and political moral anguish on
many individuals who are concerned about human rights, demo-
cracy and justice in majority Muslim countries, as well as for the
rights of Muslims in the West. The dilemma is how to defend and
promote democratic ideas, feminist demands and the rights of re-
ligious and sexual minorities without adding to the already well-
31
Radical Islamists use women’s bodies as an organizing principle
for re-ordering and re-Islamizing the already Muslim society. The
pattern of the use of coercion, intimidation and brute violence
against women inevitably desensitizes people to gender violence
and emboldens misogynist forms of violence in public and in per-
sonal relationships. An analysis of the personal conduct of a num-
ber of terrorists who have struck the US and Europe, for example,
shows the close links between political and personal violence, as
the terrorists’ first victims have invariably been their own wives.
In the US, between 2009 and 2015, 16 percent of mass shooters
had previously been charged with domestic violence. One of the
London Bridge killers, Rachid Redouane, had repeatedly kicked
and slapped his wife and tried to make her wear the hijab; Moha-
med Lahouaiej Bouhlel, who drove a truck into crowds in Nice,
had a criminal record for domestic violence; Omar Mateen, who
killed 49 people in the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, reportedly
would beat his wife on the slightest pretext. The Westminster
Bridge attacker, Khalid Masood, also had a history of domestic
violence and coercive control. (Lewis 2017) The young Canadian
man who in February of this year killed six men and wounded 17
more in a Quebec City mosque did not have a wife to beat but tur-
ned out to be harboring a grudge against feminists whom he called
“Feminazis” on his Facebook account.
However, it is important though to note that the misogynist va-
lues and practices are not the exclusive domain of extremist Isla-
mist militants. In fact, the atrocities committed by ISIL such as
the capture and enslavement of Yazidi women or Boko Haram’s
abduction of women and girls, may cloud the ongoing and endu-
ring violations with impunity of women’s basic rights, life oppor-
tunities and personal liberties in the name of religion and the na-
tion, backed by Sharia-based constitutional and civil and criminal
codes. In Turkey, for instance, one of the tragic consequences of
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self-accusing and self-defeating relativism which not only under-
mines European standards and democratic values, but creates
major obstacles to a cultural dialogue aimed at promoting peace.
Second, the cozy relations developed between Western powers
and the right-wing states in the region, which are themselves the
source of population movements and terrorism is also in need of
urgent reconsideration. Let’s not forget that some of the terrifying
forms of violence committed in the cities and villages under the
control of Daesh or ISIL, such as destroying ancient pre-Islamic
monuments, the coercive imposition of dress codes on women
and men, enforcing the eye-for-an-eye judicial system, behea-
dings, stonings, and so forth, occur in the countries that are West’s
trading partners and allies in fighting terrorism.
Related to this is the external provocation coming from outside
and the free flow of funding from the cynical oil-rich countries for
building new mosques, importing conservative Imams, suppor-
ting Islamic associations, Islamic schools, Islamic conferences,
establishing TV programs, Islamist publications, blogs, and or-
ganizing protest rallies. The stated objectives of some of these bo-
dies are to support the interests and concerns of the Muslim po-
pulations. But their mission is in reality to promote the rigid,
conservative, sexist values and moral codes of the fundamentalist
Wahhabi version of Islam and to make policy demands, such as
establishing Islamic schools, segregated swimming pools, Shari’a
courts and Friday prayers at schools, and organizing rallies against
progressive initiatives such sex education at schools, objectives
which are mudding further the brains of already confused and
frustrated youth. Several years ago, 18 youths were arrested in
Toronto as members of a terrorist cell. Several of them were later
released without charge. In the trial of one of them, Fahim Ah-
mad, a so-called ring leader among them identified as a home-
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stocked arsenal of racism and Islamophobia, and how to challenge
the demeaning stereotypes about Islam and Muslims that serve
to justify new colonial policies in the region, without resorting to
apologetic and self-glorifying practices hostile to equality, justice
and freedom.
Of one thing we can be sure: To uproot terrorists from the region
and beyond and block the growth of Islamophobia in the West, a
holistic, two-pronged approach to foreign and domestic policies
is needed. At the level of domestic policies vis-a-vis migrant po-
pulations of Muslim heritage, a reassessment of several strategies
is urgently needed. First, lawmakers and policy makers must stop
making religion their guiding principle in policy decisions. The
dominant trend until now has been that, instead of addressing
the genuine grievances and immediate concerns of the population
by adopting anti-discriminatory and anti-racist policies and pro-
viding equal opportunities for Muslims to live a decent life, free
from harassment and disrespect, the governments have fallen
into the habit of making conservative Muslims a legitimate part-
ner at the negotiation table whenever there is a need to address
the interests and grievances of Muslim populations. What these
self-appointed leaders of the Muslim community present to the
policy- and decision-makers as the interests and concerns of Mus-
lims are the politically-based interests of a tiny minority who ha-
ve a loud voice and the necessary means to promote their own
agenda. Addressing this problem, the prominent scholar, Bassam
Tibi, warned years ago that the larger societies in Europe should
be alert to the possibility of the abuse of democracy and human
rights issues by fanatical Islamists. He said they use the same
concepts “in order to grant themselves legitimacy despite their
contempt for these secular concepts.” (Tibi 2001: 225) He further
cautioned well-intentioned individuals and intellectuals in the
West that supporting Islamist movements would be an unwitting,
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Displacement and Migration in the Age of Globalization
Haideh Moghissi
Not a single day has passed in recent years without horrific stories
being reported about the massive flight of refugees from the
Middle East, Asia and Africa to Europe and about the loss of lives
during the crossing. The 2016 UNHCR report estimated that at
the end of 2015 the total number of displaced people had reached
65.3 million, “the highest ever – surpassing even post-World War
II numbers,” and that one in every 113 people worldwide, or just
under one percent of the Earth’s population, is now either an asy-
lum-seeker, internally displaced, or a refugee. (UNHCR 2017)
Half of them are children. In fact, almost one in three first-time
asylum applicants in the EU during the same period were minors,
a nine percent increase compared to 2014 levels. Also, one in four
of these were judged by national authorities to be unaccompanied
– the highest number since 2008 and a three-fold increase over
the numbers registered in 2014.The report does not even include
at least 19 million people separately uprooted by natural disasters
such as floods and earthquakes. (IDMC 2016) The unprecedented
scale of the population movements, internal displacements, mi-
grations and asylum seeking in only one-and-a-half decades into
the twenty-first century justify the UN’s identification of the de-
velopment as “the most devastating event in history.” Several
wars and civil wars, the total devastation of some countries and
the fact that the inhabitants of others are condemned to a life of
fear, ethnic cleansing, the brazen assaults on the environment,
economic instability, the onslaught on humanity in the name of
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grown terrorist, it was revealed that he was not a practicing Mus-
lim at all and barely remembered his homeland Afghanistan. And
yet following 9/11 and the war on Iraq he started going to a Mos-
que out of frustration, met other like-minded youth and influen-
ced by the Imam of the Mosque and this changed his life. (The Ca-
nadian Press 2014)
In the end, there are many indicators of increasing awareness and
resistance against militant Islamism by women and men in the
MENA region and other signs of hope. They come from people in
Tunisia who took to the streets against the return of terrorists
from conflict zones, trained in looting, raping; from the success
of women’s organizations in forcing the Egyptian state to pass a
new law against sexual harassment of women, an endemic pro-
blem in Egypt; (Mokbel 2016) and from the Iranian women who
mobilized to oust the more extremist populists in the 2017 presi-
dential elections. These activities send a loud and powerful mes-
sage that they reject the self-serving agenda of Islamists and do
not share the Islamists’ morality or nationalist chauvinism. 
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those who do voluntary work and routinely forces those granted
refugee status into destitution even homelessness through bure-
aucratic delays.” (Lyons et al. 2017)
How to deal with this record number of displaced persons is per-
haps the most pressing concern of the receiving countries both in
Europe and elsewhere, especially since there is not likely to be a
reduction in the numbers in the future. What is not often recog-
nized, however, is that population movements and the displace-
ment of millions of people are the inevitable result of a global
economic system under the sway of fanatical neoliberal policies
leading, on the one hand, to intensified economic competition for
access to larger and more diversified profitable economic resour-
ces and markets and pressure to lift border controls to facilitate
the flow of capital, goods and services, and, on the other, to re-
ductions in social spending and the dismantling of the welfare
state. These developments inevitably lead to a widening of the
gap between the rich and the poor, chronic unemployment and
poverty and an accompanying brazen assault on environment.
The point is that the European countries and the US are suddenly
become aware of the tragedy of population displacement because
a tiny fraction of these unfortunate millions, 86 percent of whom
according UNHCR estimates remain in the countries of the
South, are now knocking on their doors. They are alarmed at the
sheer numbers of asylum seekers who are fearless of the potential
danger to their lives and heedless of the fact that they are interfe-
ring with the neoliberal mantra of maintaining the highest level
of mobility of capital and production sites, and the lowest level
of labor mobility (labor in the past had to be brought to the site of
capital, now capital goes to the site of labor). What has been
erased from historical memory is the responsibility that the Eu-
ropean and North American imperialist countries bear for uproo-
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law and order, and the turn to religious and cultural intolerance,
all prompt the mass flight of people from their country of birth in
search of a decent life and security.
The overwhelming majority of refugees, however, live in coun-
tries close to their place of origin. For example of the 12.4 million
people who were displaced in 2015, 8.6 million remained within
the borders of their own country.
4)
Kenya hosts half a million in
Dabaab camps alone; one in every four people in Lebanon is a re-
fugee; Turkey is already host to almost two million refugees; li-
kewise Pakistan and to a lesser extent countries like Ethiopia,
Jordan and Iran are hosts to large numbers of refugees.
In 2015, over 1.2 million first-time asylum claims were lodged in
the EU as a whole, more than double the number registered in
2014. And by the end of 2015, at least 3,770 of those seeking asy-
lum in Europe had lost their lives in the process. (IOM 2015) The
majority of those deaths were among people trying to reach Gree-
ce and Italy by sea from North Africa.
Some European countries perform much better than others, both
in terms of the number of refugees and asylum seekers they accept
and how those granted asylum are treated afterwards. For exam-
ple, in 2015, Germany became the largest single recipient of first-
time individual asylum seekers in Europe, with almost 442,000
applications lodged in the country by the end of the year.(Some
give the figure 890,000). (IOM 2015) By contrast, Britain received
just 38,000 applications, and has the lowest approval rates for
asylum claims. A collaborative study conducted by The Guardian
and three other newspapers also reported that Britain not only
“takes fewer refugees (or 3% of applications in Europe) but offers
less generous financial support, provides housing that is often
substandard, denies asylum seekers the right to work, … punishes
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Program (SAWP). The Canadian government, through bilateral
agreements made mostly with Mexico and a few Central Ameri-
can countries, issues seasonal workers temporary visas for up to
eight months to enable them to enter the country. Canada needs
this pool of cheap, unorganized labor to do so-called 3-D jobs, that
is, jobs that are “Dirty, Difficult and Dangerous.” The growth of
commercial agriculture or agrifood industries, the break-up and
sale of lands held in common (which was prohibited by the Me-
xican constitution until this was changed in early 1990s) and the
inability of small farmers to compete with big US agribusinesses
are the missing links in the saga of Mexican workers in Canada.
The farmers are forced to abandon cultivation and find work eit-
her for the same agribusinesses or to look for work in Canada and
US. In 2008 the special representative of the UN secretary general
on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations, in
his report to the General Assembly and the Human Rights Coun-
cil proposed the framework of “Protect, Respect and Remedy” as
the guiding principles, or three aspects, of the human rights re-
sponsibility of corporations and their respective states (for exam-
ple with regard to the acquisition or confiscation of land from in-
digenous peoples). Needless to say the implementation and en-
forcement of these principles are the states’ responsibility. But
what happens when the states no longer see their role as being to
protect the welfare of citizens but instead to serve the interests of
global capital?
To return to the present so-called refugee crisis, the general re-
sponse of European and North American countries, with the ex-
ception of Germany and Canada, to this major crisis of the twen-
ty-first century has centered on strengthening border controls,
tightening asylum policies, investing citizenship status with new
importance, re-establishing visa requirements for certain coun-
tries, adopting various security measures, such as Patriot Act in
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ting millions in their former colonies – the British in India, Iraq,
Egypt and Palestine, the French in Lebanon/Syria and North Afri-
ca, the US in South East Asia and almost everywhere else. It was
certainly in recognition of this responsibility that after WWI the
League of Nations established a High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR) to deal with the millions of uprooted persons.
Nor is there any need to remind ourselves of the post-9/11, refu-
gee-inducing US/UK-led adventures in the Middle East and Africa,
the invasion of Afghanistan, the devastation of Iraq and the disin-
tegration of Libya and the emergence of ISIL and the expansion of
their army and influence following the destruction of Syria. The
unfortunate thing is that the countries that bear the greatest re-
sponsibility – namely, the US and the UK – are the ones that are
least affected by the problems of their own creation. In fact, no in-
dustrially-advanced nation can fully escape the consequences.
My point is that there should really be no surprises here. Even be-
fore the massive pressure exerted by the displaced populations
streaming into Europe from conflict zones of the Middle East and
Africa, the UN and some analysts had repeatedly warned of the
consequences of underfunded aid efforts – including the cuts to
food subsidies for the refugees in Lebanon and Jordan by European
governments and Canada – and that neglect of the impending cri-
sis would lead to disaster. This is to say that mass flights of mi-
grants and asylum seekers are intimately interconnected with
the loss of livelihoods and hope resulting from corporate greed,
confiscation of lands, neoliberal deregulations, cuts to public
spending and the unshakable faith in the power of market to
solve all social and economic problems.
For example, every year thousands of temporary migrant workers
come to Canadian farms under the Seasonal Agricultural Workers
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April 2017 showed that, for the first time in Canadian history, the
number of people over 65 is higher than the number of children
under 14. But Canada’s response to its demographic needs is an
orderly admission of 250,000 so-called legal immigrants annually.
Asylum seekers represent a small number of those admitted to
the country, except for a special provision to accept about 60,000
Syrian refugees in 2015.
Integration
Let us now shift our attention to the post-immigration problems
and the challenges of integrating resettled refugees and migrants.
Historically, several strategies have been adopted for dealing with
different cultural and religious groups and ethnic communities
brought together as a result of regional expansion and colonia-
lism. In some cases the colonial power tried to impose its own
language and cultural practices on all of its subjects. The Czarist
Russification policy and – to a lesser extent and only in specific
colonies – Frenchification policies are well-known examples. A
different policy was to maintain diverse groups in their difference
by granting them considerable autonomy in religious and cultural
practices in exchange for their acceptance of the imperial hege-
mony, as implemented in the millet system of the Ottoman Em-
pire and British policy in India and in most of its territories.
A common perception, however, is that the process of integration
and the formation of a sense of belonging for the migrants to a
new land is speedier and more harmonious in democratic socie-
ties than through specific strategies aimed at their invited or un-
invited migrant populations designed to create a space for mi-
grants through assimilationist and/or multicultural policies or a
combination of both. The fact remains, however, that integration
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the US and similar measures in Europe, and inventing new sur-
veillance methods, in particular ones based on biometrics (i.e.
devices for recognizing a person based on a physiological or be-
havioral characteristic for security identification, such as finger
printing). Donald Trump beats the drum of security in an attempt
to avoid the moral and political responsibility of US and other
Western political leaders in creating this problem; Hungary built
a wall to keep refugees out; France sealed its border with Italy; a
former British prime minister called the asylum-seekers who ga-
thered in Calais to find their way to the UK a “swarm” and the
UK opted out of the EU proposal to allocate the populations see-
king refuge in the EU proportionally among Member States and
the country eventually voted for Brexit. The response of Den-
mark to the crisis was first to reduce its social welfare benefits
by 50 percent and to place a newspaper advertisement in Leba-
nese newspapers telling potential refugees not to come to Den-
mark because social benefits are no longer as generous as before
– the assumption being that the Syrian refugees who put their
lives and the lives of their children at risk in order to escape the
war zones were enticed by Denmark’s generous social benefits.
Worse still, proposals continue to be made to stop the sea rescue
operations for refugees in distress trying to cross the Mediterra-
nean in flimsy boats.
These policies and attitudes fly in the face of the fact that demo-
graphic stagnation or shrinkage is a major cause for concern in
Europe (the birth rate in Italy in 2014 was reported to be lowest
since the founding of the Italian state in 1861; the German go-
vernment acknowledges that it needs an average of 533,000 im-
migrants per year to offset the shortage of labor in the country;
and the decrease in the birth rate Portugal and Spain coupled
with the emigration of young adults in large numbers in recent
years are also major sources of concern). Statistics in Canada in
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Integration is a major issue and it requires a give and take. Thus,
migrants can be expected to accept social norms and practices in
important areas of life in their new country and the larger society
can be expected to tolerate and show respect for benign cultural
practices or rituals that seem central to a minority’s distinct iden-
tities, psychological security and self-confidence. Maintaining a
balance between these two requirements poses enormous chal-
lenges for all concerned.
Some scholars appeal to the notion of public and private domains
within society to clarify the need for balance between the two
seemingly opposed tendencies: calling for unity and recognizing
diversity. They suggest a compromise in the form of the separati-
on between the private and public domains at the level of policy.
According to this proposal, the public domain is the proper loca-
tion of a unitary culture, whereas the private, communal domain
is the proper location for diversity. (Rex 2004) Religious and cul-
tural diversity or plurality are tolerated, and sometimes even en-
couraged, on the grounds that they do not impinge on the public
sphere. The private domain, it is argued, provides social and psy-
chological support for the individual members of cultural and re-
ligious groups, whereas the public domain is the domain of poli-
tics, the economy and the law where diversity is not permitted.
This view is, of course, open to debate because the private domain
is also the domain of family in which the rights of women, for
example, can be violated in the name of culture. The vulnerability
of women within minority communities has prompted some fe-
minists to call for “prohibiting some minority practices” so that
“moral values like individual autonomy and sexual equality” can
be enjoyed by all citizens. Others like Will Kimlicka, who, alt-
hough they defend the accommodation of cultural practices, are
aware of the paradoxes of such a policy and the danger that the
rights of individuals to autonomy and choice will be compromi-
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is not only or even predominantly about the individual migrants’
or refugees’ adaptation to the new country. Governments,
through their settlements and integration policies and practices,
and the general public, through their attitudes and responses to
the new arrivals, are partners in the integration process, particu-
larly when the cultural practices, civic behavior and life-styles of
migrant populations appear strikingly different and unusual to
the receiving society.
At the expense of simplifying the complex process of integration
and belonging, I suggest that there are two major components to
the logic of integration as it bears on citizenship. These are the
rights and duties, or the entitlements and obligations, of all resi-
dents in a country toward the society, and those of the society
and its government toward the residents. This essentially means
that there is a give and take relationship between the state, on the
one hand, and citizens, on the other, even though by virtue of ha-
ving all sorts of powers at its disposal, the responsibilities of the
state are much more extensive than those of the citizens. There
are two sides to the state’s responsibilities: first, providing practi-
cal and logistical support for resettlement in the areas of housing,
health care, education, employment and other immediate needs
of the individuals being relocated; ideally, this assistance should
be provided with sufficient attention to the needs and the dignity
of the recipients; and, second, the responsibility to protect the
human rights of the new citizens and deliver justice in the interest
of the respectful cultural integration and the security of both tho-
se directly involved and the larger society. The fulfillment of the-
se responsibilities makes peaceful interactions among citizens or
residents in a country possible in the interest of social cohesion
and undisturbed coexistence that are preconditions for sustaining
a humane society.
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not any other population regardless of their religious affiliation,
amounts in effect to imposing religion on this specific population.
In fact, religion might be the last thing on these children’s minds
compared to an uncertain future regarding education, jobs, family
separation, etc.
To take a second example: A few years ago the Ontario education
authorities, with much fanfare, allowed Friday prayers to take
place in some publically-funded middle schools in Toronto,
which also included hiring an Imam to lead the prayers for 13- to
14-year-old pupils. Again, we considered this to be an irresponsi-
ble, popularity-driven decision by individuals who were unin-
formed, and did not try to inform themselves, about the Islamic
tradition of Friday prayer, which is neither an obligatory part of
the faith nor required of children. Many people saw this as the re-
sult of a cozy relationship that has developed between decision
makers and hardline Muslim community leaders and Imams who
sell their own desires and their own agenda as those of the com-
munity. The fear was that this action would encourage more con-
servative religiosity among the children in question and even em-
bolden conservative men within Muslim communities to reject
the existing criminal and civil laws and to call instead for religio-
usly-based legal practices.
That these fears were not far off the mark was shown by the sub-
sequent launching of an extensive campaign to implement Shari’a
(Islamic laws) in arbitration in Ontario, whose success was preven-
ted only by an extensive counter-campaign by other sections of the
population, including a few Muslim women’s associations. A si-
milar campaign was conducted in the UK, where a group of Mus-
lim fundamentalists declared part of East London to be a “Shari’a
controlled zone” where women are already harassed for not cove-
ring themselves. Another interesting case was the policy of assi-
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sed for the sake of the rights the group, have suggested that “the
groups that violate their members’ basic liberties, or prevent
them from exercising their autonomy are not entitled to accom-
modation or protection.” (Ivison 2010: 11) Needless to say, those
who defend such positions still have to tell us how these ideas
can be implemented in practice.
The reality is that with the securitization of immigration and ci-
tizenship in the post-9/11 era, when “difference” is treated as suf-
ficient grounds for suspicion and a police file, Muslims in parti-
cular are exposed to much greater pressure to adopt the values of
the majority society and to integrate through social interaction
with the larger society. Some scholars, such as Taher Abbas, argue
that this reflects the general assumption that Muslims are not
making sufficient efforts to meet the obligations that go with the
claim of citizenship – that they don’t reciprocate, so to speak.
With this point in mind, I want to return to the point raised
earlier about the need for balance in policy.
Generally speaking, populations of Islamic cultural origin are per-
ceived as an undifferentiated religious community. Ethnicity, cul-
ture and religion are taken to be one and the same thing and reli-
gion is assumed to be all that there is to the identity and concerns
of anyone who comes from a specific region. Let me offer some
examples here. A friend who works with unaccompanied teenage
refugees as a counsellor in a resettlement center in Munich told
me how annoying it was to hear the center’s plan to send the
youth under its care to a Mosque in order to address their psycho-
logical and cultural concerns. He regarded this as an obviously
well-intentioned but misguided plan which reflected a rather ra-
cist perception about Muslims that reduced their whole identity,
their interests and needs to religion and religion alone. Moreover,
the fact that only Islam/Muslims are perceived in this way, and
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playing the same games, watching the same TV programs and co-
medies and even some behavioral patterns are inevitable, at least
in educational institutions and the workplace. Obviously, this is
truer of second-generation migrants who consciously or uncons-
ciously gradually distance themselves from the culture of parents.
In other words, having been brought up and educated in the coun-
try, the cultural gap narrows between the younger generations.
And the reality is that the more assimilated or adapted they be-
come, the more chances they’ll have for integration and success.
Belonging
A variety of studies have shown, however, that regardless of the
specific historical context or the reasons for departure from a
homeland, and despite differing material conditions of life in the
second country and notwithstanding where this country is loca-
ted, the first generation of migrants and refugees often continue
to live in what Edward Said has described as “the territory of not
belonging.” Narratives of voluntary and involuntary migration
from the country of birth testify to this reality and in some cases
reflect an attitude of rejection or even irrational hostility toward
the new place. During his exile in the United States in the 1940s,
Bertolt Brecht, for example, complained about everything Ame-
rican; he claimed that he was not able to open his windows in the
morning, as he used to do in Germany, because nothing in Cali-
fornia was worth breathing and smelling. (Lyon 2014) A moving
passage in Eva Hoffman’s brilliant autobiography, Lost in Trans-
lation, evokes the magical power of loss: not only does everything
that has been lost remain forever as one remembers it, but it is
“made more beautiful by the medium in which it is held and by
its stillness.” (Hoffman 1989: 115)
47
milationist, secular France of permitting polygamous immigrant
men to bring multiple wives into the country, which was stopped
only in 1993 when polygamy was declared illegal in the country.
In all of these cases, it is not unreasonable to assume that either it
is more convenient for the governments to turn to self-appointed
community leaders whenever a decision has to be made in relation
to a non-dominant ethnic group, rather than to listen to many dif-
ferent voices from within these populations; or, what is worse,
that the decisions and practices are opportunistic moves motivat-
ed exclusively by the hope of reaping rewards in the voting booth.
This is not to minimize the importance of the attitudes and the
inclinations of refugees and migrants in the process of integrati-
on. In fact, substantial numbers of immigrants rise to the chal-
lenges of learning the language of the new country if needed, fol-
low the established the rules of conduct and selectively adopt
the normative expectations of the larger society and counter
their own exclusion by trying to excel and to claim their own
space as citizens, with or without the support of the mainstream
society. These are individuals who embrace the promises and ex-
pectations of citizenship rights. This might be what Floya Ant-
hias has theorized as identifying with the country you reside in,
but not feeling that you belong. Nevertheless, this is more valid
in cases where other stigmatizing factors such as racial location,
religious affiliation and economic factors are not at work. Factors
such as the level of economic, social and political development
of the receiving society, the passage of time and proximity and
remoteness from sources of power would, of course, make a dif-
ference in this regard.
The fact is that certain degrees of assimilation through, among
other things, a unified school system and teaching single history,
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reason to value them yourself. For many refugees, this can lead
to permanent bitterness or cynicism. Many female refugees have
already experienced cruel punishments: sexual abuse and rape
are weapons of war in many parts of the world being commonly
used as forms of torture to elicit information from women and
to extract confessions from men. They have had to carry their
children from one place to another. Most often female refugee
claimants face similar forms of discrimination, bias and double
standards in “modern” societies as they had to escape from in
their “traditional” society. Wherever and whenever religion and
culture dictates assume the central role in policy decisions vis-
à-vis a migrant population, they are bound to violate the rights
of women and youth. For there is an intimate connection bet-
ween gender and culture and home and family (that is, the private
domain) are where much of culture is practiced, preserved and
transmitted to the young and the domain where men’s authority
and control over women is exercised. Providing a particular mi-
nority culture with special rights to practice its own culture of-
ten amounts to giving men the authority to violate the rights of
women and children, even though the latter are guaranteed in
the laws of the land and followed (for the most part) by the ma-
jority culture.
The clearest manifestation of the interaction between patriarchy
and racism is also revealed within the home and family. The frus-
tration inspired by racism encourages members of migrant fami-
lies to take refuge in their own culture, to stick together and to
suppress disharmony, no matter what form it takes. In this con-
text, sustaining the native culture and identity manifests itself,
among other things, in maintaining beliefs and practices pertai-
ning to men-women relationships within the family and to cul-
turally acceptable masculine-feminine values and roles.
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Two years ago the nostalgic laments of an Israeli shopkeeper in
West Jerusalem’s fashionable Ben Yehuda Street brought this
painful reality home to me. Entering his shop I was pleasantly
surprised to hear him speaking in Farsi on the phone, with heavy
Isfahani accent. We immediately connected through our common
abhorrence for the present rulers of our shared homeland, Iran. It
was sad to hear this old man, who had voluntarily migrated to Is-
rael 55 years earlier, longingly say that for him there was no place
on earth like Iran.
The sense of not belonging is most acute for the individuals who
for various reasons are more “visible” and become targets of ste-
reotypical imagery and exclusionary practices. They live mostly
in the periphery (suburb) of social and political life of the receiving
society and not at its center. The sense of not belonging causes
more emotional vulnerability and often the collapse of the sense
of self-confidence, at least initially. In some cases basic everyday
activities present a major challenge, which aggravates the deep
sense of having lost the people and things one cherishes and loves.
One becomes almost like a child and is often treated like a child
who is learning to speak and the basics of life: how to behave and
interact with people; what is polite and impolite in a foreign cul-
ture; going to school to learning a skill; and, in some cases, finding
a job, any job, regardless of one’s education and skills. Regardless
of what one learned before, all previous achievements and expe-
riences seem worthless in the new country. 
The Gender Factor
Many refugees even experience a change of character involving
a loss of self-esteem and self-confidence. When everything you
know, care for and hope for is devalued all the time, you have no
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rights of others inside or outside the community. All sides must
be expected to respect liberal and constitutional values and the
social contract which stand above personal opinions or cultural
norms and to realize that they cannot expect “one-way tolerati-
on,” as Bassam Tibi puts it.
In this regard, I want to draw attention to articles 25 and 29 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
Article 25 on the right to an adequate standard of living.
(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food,
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services,
and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in cir-
cumstances beyond his control.
(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and as-
sistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall
enjoy the same social protection.
Article 29 on duties and limitations
Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free
and full development of his personality is possible.
1.  In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely
for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the
rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just require-
ments of morality, public order and the general welfare in a de-
mocratic society.
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The naïve, narrow focus on “culture” and cultural differences,
combined with lack of attention or the will required to develop a
well-defined and consistently and forcefully implemented anti-
discrimination policy to address social and economic inequities
and injustices, promotes the formation of self-contained, isolated
and exclusivist enclaves, or what the French call “the develop-
ment of nations within nations,” to the detriment of women and
youth. Encounters with the dominant culture and its institutions
are then reduced to a bare minimum and citizenship rights are re-
duced to getting a legal document that entitles the person to
some social services and a passport.
In conclusion, in our increasingly globalized world we have no
other choice but to accept change in how we live and work and
how we think about people of very different cultural traditions
who voluntarily or involuntarily are brought together by the force
of migration. My central point in this paper has been that accom-
modating diversity requires formidable efforts from different si-
des. To be sure, it is in the first instance the responsibility of the
larger society to create the institutional mechanisms required for
the dignified and equitable integration of new immigrants. This
requires moving away from a focus on token, superficial celebra-
tions of ethnic and religious festivities, in the hope that this will
counter potent forces of prejudice and racism in more crucial are-
as of life, and on making some small changes here and there. The
problem with such approaches is that, instead of adopting a ho-
listic view that gets at the deeper roots of the problem in consul-
tation with all those involved, we are in danger of succumbing to
a false sense of confidence that the problem has been addressed.
For example, accommodating the rights and claims to cultural
difference in a multiethnic society is an issue of human rights
and a matter of legal obligation for the government. But such ac-
commodation must always be conditional on respect for the
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confidence and the overall contentment of the individuals mo-
ving to a new country.
What we don’t have in Canada, and what I believe is necessary, is
an institution similar to Germany’s Federal Agency for Civic
Education – with the generous funding and the flexibility beyond
what was set up following the Second World War to de-Nazify the
German population – to meet the needs for the civic education of
citizens under conditions of a rapidly changing population make-
up in the interest of promoting real democracy. The hope here is
that with full participation in the social and economic life of the
new country, with meaningful interaction with the larger society
and engagement in civic activities, new migrants will gradually
find their own place and their voice within the society as persons
with overlapping identities. Identities are then merged and/or re-
constructed in the new country in an interactive process. Such a
development would reduce cultural isolation, creating space for
cultural infiltration and interaction, and for inter-cultural lear-
ning in the interest of social cohesion and bridging the divide bet-
ween the central and the peripheral cultures. Only through two-
way exchanges between different cultural traditions in any given
country will integration and inclusive citizenship become mea-
ningful. 
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2.  These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contra-
ry to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
I think that despite the limitation of the human rights paradigm
(namely its focus on civil and political rights), or the politically
motivated and self-serving use of the human rights discourse by
Western governments based on double standards, the philosophi-
cal foundation of human rights is still something we can refer to
in claiming the rights to which we are entitled as human beings.
5)
My final point is that in a genuine democracy the focus of the
state is or should be less on its regulatory and disciplinary functi-
ons, which often serve the interests of the minority elite, and mo-
re on its ability and responsibility to provide and guarantee equal
opportunities to all people who live in a country and to protect
them against discrimination and violation of rights in different
areas of life. As I have argued, only under such conditions can loy-
alty be demanded from citizens or can the integration of the
newcomers and bonds of national solidarity be achieved. The ab-
sence or the weakness of this reciprocal relationship gives rise to
tensions between conflicting aims on both sides. The documen-
ted experiences of the majority of new immigrants from the South
in Europe, Canada and elsewhere provide ample confirmation of
this reality.
Having said all this, there are also signs of positive steps taken to
reduce this tension. For example, across Canada, about 235 agen-
cies and community organizations work to serve immigrants in
the areas of settlement and labor market integration, offering em-
ployment preparation courses and advice to immigrants, in addi-
tion to services provided by private organizations and churches.
(Moghissi 2016) The focus is normally on the economic integra-
tion of migrants as a very important factor in promoting the self-
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